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THE CHALLENGE OF BELIEF 
STEPHEN L. CARTER* 
Suppose you believe that the ice on your local pond is thinner than it looks. 
Very likely you will decide not to skate today. If you happen to be a 
humanitarian sort, you will warn others as well. You might even contact the 
local authorities and demand that they put up a sign forbidding anyone from 
going out there until the condition of the ice improves. Each of these actions 
would be entirely natural, and, in many circumstances, predictable. 
Readers may recognize this hypothetical as a gloss on an example deployed 
by the philosopher Gilbert Ryle in his clever demonstration that to believe a 
proposition p means not simply to have a particular state of mind concerning p 
but also to have a disposition toward a particular set of actions that are 
consistent with p.1 Even critics who consider “disposition” the wrong concept 
concede that Ryle is on to something: when we speak of “belief,” we are 
invoking a far more complicated set of concepts than simply an evaluation of 
the likelihood that p is true.2 
Specifically, Ryle argues that “believe” is what he calls a “motive word,” an 
explanation for one’s disposition to say certain things or act in certain ways.3 
The concept therefore is quite different from what we call knowledge 
(although, as Ryle says, they play in the same field). But it is also different 
from guessing, or from calculating probabilities. Belief plays a unique role in 
human thought. And religious belief, in important ways, provides the 
apotheosis of the concept. 
Consider a particular proposition p1: “The spirit that guides my destiny must 
be nourished with the blood of a freshly killed animal six times a year, or the 
spirit will die and my life will end in disaster.” Anna believes p1. Anna is a 
member of a faith community that also believes p1. Anna, however, is also a 
member of a political community, a majority of whose members decide that 
killing animals is wrong. Her fellow citizens explain: “You are free to believe 
p1 if you choose, but you may not act on that belief.”4 
 
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University. 
1 GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 134-35 (1949). 
2 See, e.g., P. M. S. Hacker, Of the Ontology of Belief, in SEMANTIK UND ONTOLOGIE: 
BEITRÄGE ZUR PHILOSOPHISCHEN FORSCHUNG 189 (Mark Siebel & Mark Textor eds., 2004). 
3 RYLE, supra note 1, at 134. 
4 A burden that arises in this way, not because of the demands of belief but because of 
the intersection between those demands and the contrary commands of the state, is what the 
philosopher Peter Jones calls an “extrinsic” burden. See Peter Jones, Bearing the 
Consequences of Belief, 2 J. POL. PHIL. 24, 38 (1994). In contrast, an “intrinsic” burden is 
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According to Ryle, from Anna’s point of view the statement is incoherent. 
Her belief in p1 involves a disposition to act. If Anna believes that her guiding 
spirit will die if not properly nourished, she will naturally seek to nourish it, 
and, if she is a humanitarian sort, will help other believers to nourish their 
guiding spirits too. If she is sufficiently kind and loving, she might even try to 
persuade others who do not believe p1 that they, too, should believe p1. 
Therefore to say that Anna is not free to act as her belief in p1 disposes her 
is, in practice, to say that she is not permitted to believe p1. We might well 
have good reasons for prohibiting Anna from acting on her belief; but we 
should not pretend that we are nevertheless permitting her to hold it. What we 
are doing instead is telling Anna that we have decided that p1 itself is wrong 
and using coercive force to keep her from acting as belief in p1 disposes her to 
act.5 
The example comes to mind in response to Ronald Dworkin’s final book, 
Religion Without God. Until his untimely death last year, Dworkin was perhaps 
our foremost philosopher of law, and certainly among the staunchest defenders 
of liberalism. The book is beautifully written, intellectually challenging, and 
powerfully argued. Its central thesis is admirable and rich. But its 
understanding of religious belief is flawed, and the flaw carries over into the 
discussion of constitutional law. 
* * * 
Dworkin’s thesis is stated in his title. He seeks both to describe and to 
defend the concept of religion without God. In Dworkin’s telling, both today’s 
militant atheists and today’s adamant religionists are missing a larger truth. 
Theistic religion is but one way of responding to our realization that there is 
such a thing as objective value, that “the universe and its creatures are awe-
inspiring,” and that “human life has purpose and the universe order.”6 In 
understanding the theistic religions, says Dworkin, we should separate their 
science – their accounts of creation, for example – from their values – their 
“convictions about how people should live and what they should value.”7 Once 
 
one created entirely by the commands of the religion itself but unaffected by the laws of the 
state. Thus, for example, an Orthodox Jewish male’s belief that he must keep his head 
covered is entirely intrinsic until he joins the military and is subject to its uniform 
regulations, at which point the burden becomes extrinsic. The Supreme Court is 
unpersuaded that this particular burden demands constitutional exemption. See Goldman v. 
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1985). The Department of Defense, however, has grown 
more sensitive to this burden over time. See DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 1300.17, at 
4(b) (2014), archived at http://perma.cc/3MLP-M9RQ. 
5 Robert Cover urged that we acknowledge openly that regulatory decisions that make it 
difficult or impossible to practice a religious belief have the practical effect of destroying 
that belief. See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 33 
(1983). 
6 RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD 1 (2013). 
7 Id. at 15. 
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we strip away the science of the religions, we discover that “[w]hat divides 
godly and godless religion . . . is not as important as the faith in value that 
unites them.”8 
Dworkin’s initial purpose in this exposition is to persuade the reader that 
one can find a religious sensibility in our awe and wonder before the beauty of 
a great work of art, the symmetry of the subatomic world, or the unimaginable 
perfection of the universe. He insists that naturalism is the enemy, and that it is 
simply wrong to adopt a vision of life in which truths (including moral truths) 
are all contingent, whether biologically or culturally. Rather than dividing the 
world between theists and atheists, we should admit the category of “religious 
atheists.”9 
One senses here the influence of critical theory, in particular Max 
Horkheimer, who in his short essay, Thoughts on Religion – penned between 
the world wars – pondered what religion, as it declines, leaves in its wake: 
“Part of the drives and desires which religious belief preserved and kept alive 
are detached from the inhibiting religious form and become productive forces 
in social practice.”10 
Dworkin readily concedes that his central idea – that religion is “deeper” 
than God – isn’t new. He acknowledges his debt to Einstein and Spinoza. He 
also argues, although I am not sure he is right, that the same notion is 
immanent in Tillich. (It’s interesting that he doesn’t here delve into 
Kierkegaard.) The analogous claim, that theistic religion holds no monopoly 
on the sacred, features prominently, for example, in my colleague Paul W. 
Kahn’s provocative monograph, Political Theology.11 Both Kahn and Dworkin 
are writing in part to defend a pluralistic public space, although Kahn is 
interested in sovereignty and the political realm, whereas Dworkin is interested 
ultimately in law reform. 
Dworkin would like to set aside our furious battles over the scope of 
religious freedom under the Free Exercise Clause, and replace the theistic 
understanding of religion that dominates constitutional thought with a broader 
right to “ethical independence”12 – a right to decide for oneself how to 
approach a “felt conviction that the universe really does embody a sublime 
 
8 Id. at 29. It is important here to appreciate what Dworkin means by “value.” The part of 
religion involving value “does not depend—cannot depend—on any god’s existence or 
history.” Id. at 9. As Dworkin himself implicitly acknowledges, no serious religionist is 
likely to agree. 
9 Id. at 5. 
10 MAX HORKHEIMER, Thoughts on Religion, in CRITICAL THEORY: SELECTED ESSAYS 
129, 131 (Matthew J. O’Connell trans., 1972). 
11 PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 23 (2011). I am not criticizing Religion Without God for not citing Kahn’s 
book, which, unless I miss my guess, was published after Dworkin delivered the Einstein 
lectures on which Dworkin’s monograph is based. 
12 DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 130. 
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beauty”13 – a right, according to Dworkin, that represents an interpretive 
conception superior to theistic religion. 
* * * 
How would the accommodation of ethical independence work in practice? 
Evidently, almost as badly as the accommodation of religion has worked up 
until this point. Dworkin doesn’t join the statists who believe that the religious 
objector should always lose; but it isn’t easy to identify the principles that 
explain the distinctions he draws. 
For Dworkin, the paradigmatic case is Employment Division v. Smith,14 
where the Supreme Court effectively rejected a claim by adherents of the 
Native American Church for an exemption allowing them to use peyote in their 
religious rituals.15 Accommodationists, myself included, have attacked the 
decision for years, but Dworkin thinks the case was rightly decided. The right 
to ethical independence, he says, “does not protect the religious use of a 
banned hallucinogenic drug when that use threatens general damage to the 
community.”16 Under the right to ethical independence, “religions may be 
forced to restrict their practices so as to obey rational, nondiscriminatory laws 
that do not display less than equal concern for them.”17 That line might almost 
have been lifted from Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Smith: “We have 
never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance 
with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to 
regulate.”18 
Exceptions, writes Dworkin, might be granted by the legislature, when they 
“can be managed with no significant damage to the policy in play.”19 His 
choice of example is striking, given the current political moment. Perhaps, 
Dworkin suggests, a Catholic family-services agency that refuses to place 
adoptive children with same-sex couples should gain an exemption, given the 
centrality of the Church’s position on sexuality to its teaching, provided that 
there are sufficient alternatives that comply with the relevant 
nondiscrimination law.20 But Dworkin is crystal clear that exemptions should 
be few. 
How to explain the distinction among results? Here, Dworkin is fascinating: 
 
13 Id. at 65. 
14 494 U.S. 872 (1989). 
15 Id. at 890. 
16 DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 135. 
17 Id. at 136. 
18 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79. 
19 DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 136. 
20 Id. This is an analogue to the Mrs. Murphy exception to the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 
and proposes an optimal rather than a perfect level of enforcement. 
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So government may not forbid drug use just because it deems drug use 
shameful, for example; it may not forbid logging just because it thinks 
that people who do not value great forests are despicable; it may not levy 
highly progressive taxes just because it thinks that materialism is evil. But 
of course ethical independence does not prevent government from 
interfering with people’s chosen ways of life for other reasons: to protect 
other people from harm, for example, or to protect natural wonders, or to 
improve the general welfare. So it may forbid drugs to protect the 
community from the social costs of addiction, it may levy taxes to finance 
roads and aid the poor, and it may protect forests because forests are in 
fact wonderful. It may protect forests for that reason even though none of 
its citizens thinks a life wandering among them has any value.21 
The quotation contains a great deal of meat, but let us focus for a moment 
on that last example, the protection of forests. If the state can override ethical 
independence by taxing its people to support forests on the ground that forests 
are good, why can’t the state also override ethical independence by taxing its 
people to support churches on the ground that churches are good? One could of 
course make the case that the goodness of forests is less contestable than the 
goodness of churches. I am skeptical that this is so, but, even if it is, the 
difference would seem to be one of degree. Or one could make the case that 
supporting churches violates the rights of those who object on ethical grounds, 
but this is precisely what Dworkin does not want to say. After all, there are 
also those who would object to supporting forests on ethical grounds – and 
their wishes and desires, he makes clear, do not matter. 
One could perhaps make the claim that a forest, unlike a church, is a public 
good that confers a net social benefit but, absent state support, will be 
underproduced. Churches, on the other hand, might be said to reflect the 
market for religion: if people demand them and are willing to pay for them, 
then they will be built. I think this argument is essentially correct, but it is easy 
to see how one could reach a different conclusion. If I happen to believe that 
churches confer a net social benefit and yet are being underproduced, the same 
argument applies. Similarly, I might like forests and yet think them 
overproduced. 
For Dworkin, in any case, none of this is the point. What matters is that 
“forests are in fact wonderful.” This is precisely the sort of objective truth that 
he has always sought in his work. It is even a truth, presumably, on which 
theistic and atheistic religionists might agree. But notice what happens when 
the government’s truth comes into conflict with the opposing truth claims of 
the religionist: in all but a handful of cases, whether under Dworkin’s model or 
the Supreme Court’s, the religionist loses.22 
 
21 Id. at 130-31. 
22 See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); 
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). Recent victories of religious objectors are not 
to the contrary. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal 
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* * * 
Here we might profitably return to the discussion of belief that opened the 
Essay. If belief indeed involves a disposition to act, and the government, in 
assertion of its own truth, forbids the action toward which the believer is 
disposed, the practical effect is to outlaw the belief itself. This is essentially 
what the legal scholar Robert Cover had in mind in referring to such conflicts 
as potentially “jurispathic” – meaning that a defeat in an accommodation case 
will chip away at the protesting religion’s supporting narrative.23 The 
theologian Stanley Hauerwas refers to this process as the majority’s use of the 
coercive violence of law “to force others into their story.”24 The religious 
narrative matters because it is through the narrative that the disposition is 
formed. The believer, by participating in the story, learns how to behave. 
In defending Ryle’s view that a belief in its essence inclines the believer 
toward a particular course of action, I do not mean to suggest that any 
particular belief is therefore beyond criticism. Beliefs can be wrong. As Ryle 
says, “like aversions and phobias they can be unacknowledged; like fashions 
and tastes they can be contagious; like loyalties and animosities they can be 
induced by tricks.”25 
Still, it would be a strange religious freedom indeed that protected only 
beliefs the state happened to approve. And I take it that Dworkin would insist 
that to override a particular belief is not necessarily to treat the belief as 
wicked. But that is precisely where the problem lies. As Cover points out, 
many religious groups counted otherwise as liberal filed amicus curiae briefs 
supporting Bob Jones University when the federal government acted to take 
away its tax-exempt status because of its religiously grounded policies of racial 
discrimination.26 This should hardly be surprising. In Christianity, belief is 
understood much as Ryle understands it: not as a mental assent to a particular 
proposition but as a commitment to live in a particular way. The first words of 
the Apostles’ Creed are “I believe in God.” According to the Reverend J. G. H. 
Barry, in his well-known Meditations on the Apostles’ Creed, the words imply 
“trust[ing] the God who has trusted me by making me his own child and 
sending me forth to serve him.”27 
 
Employment Opportunity Commission, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), for example, involved a 
federal overreach so absurd that the government was silly even to attempt it. And Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, 2014 WL 2921709 (U.S. June 30, 2014), rested on 
statutory and not constitutional grounds. 
23 See Cover, supra note 5, at 40-44. 
24 STANLEY HAUERWAS, The Church as God’s New Language, in SCRIPTURAL 
AUTHORITY AND NARRATIVE INTERPRETATION (Garrett Green ed., 1987), reprinted in THE 
HAUERWAS READER 142, 145 (John Berkman & Michael Cartwright eds., 2001). 
25 RYLE, supra note 1, at 134. 
26 See Cover, supra note 5, at 62-63 (discussing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 
U.S. 574 (1983)). 
27 J. G. H. BARRY, MEDITATIONS ON THE APOSTLES’ CREED 36 (2d ed. 1916). 
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The Christian isn’t tasked with having a certain state of mind. The Christian, 
sent forth to serve God, is tasked with behaving a certain way. Christian belief 
leads to Christian action. This was the concern of the Bob Jones amici, who 
sought to defend not the school’s theology,28 but the school’s right to its 
theology. The amici didn’t support racial segregation; they worried that a 
government able to punish Bob Jones for its policies might one day take aim at 
the Christian core – or the core of other religions. As laws and regulations 
proliferated, more religious narratives might face destruction. 
With this in mind, let’s go back for a moment to Anna, the believer in p1, 
who has been told by other members of her political community that she may 
not kill animals to nourish her guiding spirit, even though she believes that her 
life will otherwise end in disaster. I doubt that Dworkin would have much 
trouble upholding the community’s judgment. Let’s imagine then a 
conversation between Dworkin and Anna, who seeks to understand why she 
cannot follow her belief: 
Anna:  “My personal spirit is going to die if I am not permitted to 
nourish it.” 
Dworkin:  “The law isn’t directed at you, so it doesn’t deny you any 
equal concern. Also, to let you kill animals when others can’t 
would mean discrimination in your favor, to say nothing of 
significant damage to an important and collectively 
determined social policy.” 
Anna:  “My life will be ruined.” 
Dworkin:  “No, it won’t.” 
Anna:  “It won’t?” 
Dworkin:  “You only think that because you believe p1.” 
Anna:  “That’s exactly why I think it!” 
Dworkin:  “That’s a private matter. The state cannot act as if p1 is true. 
Remember that p1 is only one of many ways to experience 
the felt sense of awe before the wonder of the universe. You 
may not be able to act as your belief in p1 disposes you to 
act, but that should not decrease your sense of awe; that is 
where true religion is found.” 
Anna:  “You’re saying that your monism is prior to my monism.” 
Dworkin:  “Only because it is. I mean no disrespect.” 
Anna:  “Then you’re effectively prohibiting me from believing in 
p1.” 
Dworkin:  “You can believe p1 if you like. Your fellow citizens are 
constraining you only from certain acts.”29 
 
28 Cover, supra note 5, at 28. 
29 For a thoughtful discussion of this conflict, see Gerhard van der Schyff, Ritual 
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Perhaps I have Dworkin wrong in this little dialogue, but I don’t think so. 
He sees belief as Hume did, as simply a state of mind, an arrangement of the 
mental faculty.30 To think otherwise would require Dworkin to accept the 
notion that the government must accommodate bona fide religious beliefs, 
unless the statute in question is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state 
interest – an argument that he explicitly rejects.31 
In the absence of an accommodation principle, however, religious freedom 
becomes meaningless – literally so.32 For the believer, it is the connection with 
God that gives meaning to life, and the relevant freedom is the freedom to live 
in a manner expressive of that connection.33 The liberal state, however, has 
chosen instead to carve out a tiny sphere in which the religious can act freely – 
Hosanna-Tabor34 comes to mind – and to pat itself on the back for having 
done so. “We shall do you the kindness,” says the liberal state, “of allowing 
you to choose your own ministers and other worship leaders. Are we not 
generous?” The corollary is implied, and on occasion acted upon: “Step 
outside the sphere we have assigned you, and you will be punished.” 
And of what does the punishment consist? Just this: Treating as untrue the 
religious belief that disposes the believer to act. 
* * * 
I could take issue with other parts of Religion Without God. I would reject, 
for example, Dworkin’s assumption that religious convictions should 
automatically be conceptualized as chosen.35 One proposition on which 
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam all agree is that we do not choose God; God 
 
Slaughter and Religious Freedom in a Multilevel Europe: The Wider Importance of the 
Dutch Case, 3 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 76 (2014). 
30 DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 26-27. 
31 Id. at 134-35. 
32 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a 
Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, Justice 
Brennan’s Accommodating Approach Toward Religion, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2187 (2007); 
Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1986). 
My own view is also strongly proaccommodation. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Religious 
Freedom as if Religion Matters: A Tribute to Justice Brennan, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1059 
(1999); Stephen L. Carter, The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
118, 122-23 (1993). 
33 Contrary to Dworkin’s assumption, see DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 112-13, it needn’t 
be – and usually isn’t – the fear of God’s wrath that drives the believer’s compliance with 
Divine Edict. The liberal notion that believers follow God because they are frightened of 
him has been nicely skewered by George Steiner. See GEORGE STEINER, NOSTALGIA FOR THE 
ABSOLUTE (1974). 
34 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 696 
(2012). 
35 See Stephen L. Carter, Must Liberalism Be Violent? A Reflection on the Work of 
Stanley Hauerwas, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 201 (2012). 
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chooses us. To claim otherwise, as Slavica Jakelić has put it, “marginalize[s] 
their major feature, belonging, which individuals most often experience as 
ascribed, not chosen, and understand as fixed, not changeable.”36 Similarly, the 
philosopher Peter Jones, who sees one’s religious account of the world as 
constitutive of one’s cultural understanding, writes: “The idea of ‘choosing’ a 
culture has the same absurdity about it as the idea of trying to start a 
tradition.”37 
Dworkin’s contention that moral judgment is prior to religious experience is 
at the heart of his argument. But the contention isn’t new, and isn’t even 
theologically objectionable – in Christian terms, at least. A version of the same 
claim formed the basis of the Reverend Samuel Clarke’s famous attack on 
Hobbes in his Boyle Lecture back in 1704.38 The approach to religious 
establishment that Dworkin briefly outlines is intriguing, but in the end fails to 
advance the ball. Once religious freedom is understood to encompass more 
than theistic religion, he wonders, must the antiestablishment rules be 
understood the same way?39 Dworkin deserves credit for even raising the 
issues, for it is the shaky conceit of most constitutional scholars – and most 
judges – that the word “religion,” which appears only once in the First 
Amendment, is nevertheless to be interpreted as though it appears twice, 
carrying one definition for the purposes of establishment, and another for the 
purposes of free exercise. 
But when, a few pages later, Dworkin actually applies his freedom of ethical 
independence to the problem of establishment, he winds up in roughly the 
same place as American courts already have. He concludes, for example, that 
religious symbols don’t belong on public property “unless these have 
genuinely been drained of all but ecumenical cultural significance.”40 About 
secular symbols that might offend against ethical independence, he says not a 
word. 
Dworkin comes next to public education. He swiftly disposes of classroom 
prayer.41 Intelligent design gives him more pause. On first blush, he concedes, 
one might suppose that instruction in Darwinian evolution necessarily involves 
the assumption “that one conception of how to live, of what makes a successful 
life, is superior to others.”42 Thus the teaching of evolution might offend 
 
36 SLAVICA JAKELIĆ, COLLECTIVISTIC RELIGIONS: RELIGION, CHOICE, AND IDENTITY IN 
LATE MODERNITY 8 (2010). 
37 Jones, supra note 4, at 31. 
38 Samuel Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, in A 
DEMONSTRATION OF THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD AND OTHER WRITINGS 3, 87 (Ezio 
Vailati ed., 1998). 
39 DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 115-16. 
40 Id. at 138. 
41 Id. at 140-41. 
42 Id. at 141-42. Here Dworkin is influenced by, but also responding to, Thomas Nagel. 
See Thomas Nagel, Public Education and Intelligent Design, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 187 
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against the right of ethical independence of dissenting students and their 
parents. 
Only this turns out not to be true – not, at least, “[i]n the circumstances of 
American culture.” In Dworkin’s view, the distinction between teaching 
evolution and teaching intelligent design suddenly rests on the motive of their 
respective supporters. And he evidently knows what those motives are. 
Supporters of intelligent design want to impose their worldview on others. But 
it is “an implausible hypothesis” that a similar desire motivates supporters of 
evolution.43 
The discussion of education highlights Dworkin’s troubling habit of 
directing casual pejoratives toward religionists with whom he disagrees. “The 
zealots have great political power in America,” he thunders, referring, he 
explains, to “the so-called religious right.”44 But the so-called religious right is 
moribund, largely in retreat since the collapse of Moral Majority more than a 
decade ago, the domestication of Christian Coalition, and the decision of many 
other groups – Focus on the Family comes to mind – to steer far clearer of 
politics than in the past.45 On issue after issue, from same-sex marriage to 
abortion, the supposedly powerful zealots are going down to defeat. From 
Dworkin’s tone, one might think that religion in general and Christianity in 
particular had never been anything but antithetical to the values of the 
Enlightenment. But in many ways (true, not all!) the church was foundational 
to the Enlightenment, a point established long ago by historians, among them 
Peter Gay,46 Brian Tierney,47 and of course, most famously, Harold Berman.48 
Dworkin has gone to a great deal of trouble to understand the physics that so 
fascinates him but has done very little to understand the villains of his essay. 
Thus, when referring to the advocates of intelligent design, he has this to say: 
“[T]hey are part of a national campaign of the so-called religious right to 
increase the role of godly religion in public life.”49 This is the common liberal 
telling of the tale, but it is, as I and others explain elsewhere, almost certainly 
wrong.50 If one troubles to talk to the advocates of such programs, what one 
discovers is a disagreement over epistemology. The advocates are heavily 
parents who don’t want the state force-feeding their children what they see as 
 
(2008). 
43 DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 143. 
44 Id. at 8. 
45 See STEPHEN L. CARTER, DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON LAW, 
RELIGION, AND LOYALTY 9 (1998). 
46 See generally PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1996). 
47 See generally BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS (1997); BRIAN TIERNEY, 
RELIGION, LAW, AND THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 1150-1650 (1982). 
48 See generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION (1983). 
49 DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 142-43. 
50 See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 45, at 8; STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD’S NAME IN VAIN 7 
(2000). 
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lies.51 Indeed, from the point of view of parents who believe, for example, in 
the young-earth theory, it is the secular zealots who have their hands on the 
levers of power and are intent on wiping out religions they don’t like. 
It’s always nice when a story has a villain. But Dworkin’s argument is 
perfectly compelling and provocative without one. Indeed, having spent so 
many pages in critique of Religion Without God, I should reiterate what I said 
at the start: that his overall project in the book is an admirable one. The bridge 
he is trying to build is a bridge well worth building, and I can think of no finer 
engineer for the project than Ronald Dworkin. Religion and science can live in 
concord, and so can theistic and nontheistic understandings of the ways and 
reasons that the universe inspires and awes us. Religion Without God reads like 
the prologue to a mighty and important project. It would have been a 
wonderful thing had Dworkin lived long enough to finish the story. 
 
51 CARTER, supra note 45, at 42-43. 
